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Feature Article 
THE OIL PRICE COLLAPSE: SOW EFFECTS OB THE SCOTTISH ECOMOM 
Alex Salmond, Royal Bank of Scotland 
Jim Walker, 
Fraser of Allander I n s t i t u t e , University of Strathclyde 
1. Background to the collapse 
A major factor affecting Scot t ish economic 
ac t i v i t y in 1986 has been the collapse in 
world o i l p r i c e s . Figure 1.1 shows how 
tiie spot pr ice of North Sea o i l has fa l len 
by around 50$ since the beginning of the 
year. In the short run o i l markets and 
pr ices are dominated by OPEC supply 
decisions ( i e how much o i l i s released 
onto the market or ra ther how much o i l the 
c a r t e l i s able to keep off i t ) . In the 
medium-term, however, the key factors 
control l ing pr ices are t o t a l demand and 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of non-OPEC suppl ie rs . 
Thus in the four years from 1980, the year 
of the l a s t OPEC pr ice ' h i k e ' , OPEC found 
i t increasingly d i f f i c u l t to hold dol lar 
pr ices in the face of an 11.5? decline in 
world o i l demand and a substant ia l r i s e in 
non-OPEC production. Until l a s t year 
Saudi Arabia, the c a r t e l ' s l a rges t 
producer and effect ively i t s output 
regula tor , took the s t r a in and her exports 
of crude f e l l by almost 60$ from 1979-84 
compared with an OPEC average of j u s t over 
40$. In mid-1985 Saudi adopted a new 
strategy designed to recapture market 
share and t o d i sc ip l ine both r eca l c i t r an t 
OPEC members and unco-operative non-OPEC 
suppl iers l i k e the UK. In the second 
half of the year Saudi production doubled 
and pricing was moved onto an increasingly 
aggressive basis ( the s t rategy devised by 
the now deposed Saudi o i l minister , Sheikh 
Yamani). 
To a large extent Saudi has achieved her 
aims a lbe i t a t a high penalty in terms of 
l o s t o i l revenues for the OPEC count r ies . 
A l imited amount of high cost non-OPEC o i l 
has been pushed off the market, there have 
been offers of co-operation from most non-
OPEC suppl iers (with the notable exception 
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of the UK) wh i l e Saud i ' s e r r a n t p a r t n e r s 
have been brought more i n t o l i n e . Most 
success fu l of a l l , however, has been the 
crushing impact of low o i l p r i c e s on 
exploration and development work in high 
c o s t a r ea s such as t h e North Sea. This 
brings closer the day when Saudi and OPEC 
can hope to r easse r t market control . 
These d r ama t i c even t s have had and a re 
c o n t i n u i n g t o h a v e m a j o r i m p a c t s 
throughout the UK and Scott ish economies. 
In contrast to the main influences on the 
economy in 1984 and 1985 i e the phasing 
out of c a p i t a l a l lowances on inves tment 
and t h e m i n e r s ' s t r i k e , wh ich were 
domestic i ssues . I t has been argued tha t 
the o i l pr ice f a l l i s an event outside the 
c o n t r o l of the UK government. However, 
government policy has had an influence in 
the p r e sen t d e s t a b l i s a t i o n of world o i l 
m a r k e t s b o t h t h r o u g h t h e UK's l o n g -
s tanding high d e p l e t i o n po l icy and i t s 
more r e c e n t m a r k e t - r e l a t e d s t a n c e on 
p r i c i n g adopted wi th the d e c i s i o n to 
a b o l i s h t h e B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l O i l 
Corporat ion in ea r l y 1985 i e . t o make no 
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effort to bols ter o i l prices through 
support buying. In Scotland, investment 
i s expected to be h i t badly s ince 
businesses with interests in the North Sea 
are estimated to account for 20% of total 
S c o t t i s h p r i v a t e n o n - r e s i d e n t i a l 
investment. The Fraser of Allander 
I n s t i t u t e has f o r e c a s t t h a t t o t a l 
investment will grow by only 1.8% in 1986. 
In contrast , according to comparisons of 
ou t s ide f o r e c a s t s undertaken by the 
Treasury, the average UK fixed investment 
growth r a t e f o r e c a s t s tands a t 2.9% 
(although the usually opt imis t ic London 
Business School believes i t wi l l be only 
2%). On the o ther hand, consumers' 
expenditure and industrial activity in oil 
consuming sectors i s expected to increase 
with the f a l l in in f la t ion and energy 
costs which have accompanied the reduction 
in the o i l p r i c e . Never the less , 
increasing unemployment, much of i t caused 
by the fa l l in o i l pr ices , wi l l also play 
a pa r t and consumers' expenditure in 
Scotland is expected to underperform the 
corresponding UK measure. 
The o i l p r i c e f a l l c a r r i e s s e r i o u s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s for o i l producing and 
exporting economies, such as Scotland, 
although i t shall have beneficial effects 
in lowering costs in the non-oil producing 
LDCs and net o i l importing countries as 
well as on the non-oil re la ted , or o i l 
consuming, sectors of the UK and Scottish 
economies. Other f o r e c a s t e r s and 
commentators on the UK economy, eg the 
London Business School, the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research 
and HM Treasury have tended towards the 
view that the macroeconomic repercussions 
of the oi l price f a l l wi l l have a net 
beneficial or broadly neutral effect on 
the UK economy albeit, in some cases, via 
an exchange rate correction. They argue 
that the i n i t i a l adverse terms of t rade, 
current account and government revenue 
e f f e c t s w i l l , in t ime , be more than 
balanced by the increased activity induced 
through higher product ive p o t e n t i a l 
domestically and internationally and the 
expansion of world trade. 
Both nationally and internationally, the 
immediate impact of lower o i l pr ices i s 
negative on demand as the ' l o se r s ' (oil 
producing s t a t e s , net o i l exporters and 
oil related companies) tend to adjust more 
quickly to the new economic circumstances 
than the ' w i n n e r s ' ( o i l consuming 
countries and non-oil indus t r ies ) . Thus 
the impact of a collapse in o i l pr ices i s 
not the reciprocal of an oi l price 'hike'. 
In the international economy the hoped for 
beneficial effects of low o i l pr ices 
depend on how quickly the supply side 
b e n e f i t s can outweigh the immediate 
depressionary effects on world demand. In 
time the impact i s l ike ly to be posi t ive 
assuming tha t the low o i l price regime 
does not lead directly to serious economic 
dislocation (through, for example, a 
banking default from an indebted o i l 
producer). Balanced against this i s the 
danger that the o i l price f a l l wi l l be 
followed after a few years by an oil price 
shock upwards which would be unambiguously 
negative for world growth. 
As far as the UK economy i s concerned the 
position i s even more uncertain. The UK 
would benefi t from any boost to world 
growth but macro-policy has already been 
severely 'crowded-in' by exchange r a t e 
pressures arising directly from lower oi l 
value. In addition, at best, the UK will 
face a posit ion where major competitors 
are exper ienc ing r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r 
benefits from cheaper energy. I t would 
seem unlikely that the UK, as a country 
currently producing o i l a t almost double 
domestic r equ i r emen t s , has economic 
interests identical to those of her energy 
consuming European partners. Nor is i t a 
particularly good argument to suggest (as 
the Bank of England (1982) has done) that, 
through time, the UK i s a net oil consumer 
and therefore has an in t e re s t in low o i l 
prices. In fact the current level of o i l 
prices i s l ike ly to lead to lower UK oi l 
production in the early 1990's when prices 
c o u l d be s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r . 
Unfortunately for the UK, present prices 
are directly related to future production 
but inversely related to future prices (as 
current low prices depress development 
ac t iv i ty in high cost areas, such as the 
North Sea, then low production cost areas, 
such as the Middle East, corner more and 
more of an expanding world market for oi l . 
This provides the c a r t e l with the 
opportunity for ra is ing prices in the 
future). 
Scotland would seem to be a clear 'loser1; 
in that group of oil exporting states and 
o i l related indust r ies which are feeling 
the immediate and adverse impact of the 
o i l p r i c e c o l l a p s e on o u t p u t and 
employment. The purpose of this ar t icle 
i s to examine how significant the impact 
i s l ikely to be. 
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2 . Eaployaent and output e f f e c t s of the 
o i l price collapse. 
In t h e s ix months to June 1986 d i r e c t 
employment in f irms with more than 80J of 
t he i r employment in the North Sea o i l and 
o i l r e l a t e d s e c t o r s f e l l by 5 ,284 
(Manpower Services Commission 1986). At 
the same time, there has been a var iety of 
f o r e c a s t s , b u s i n e s s , a c a d e m i c and 
p o l i t i c a l , which have a t t e m p t e d t o 
e s t i m a t e both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t job 
losses in the Scot t ish economy due to the 
r e d u c t i o n in a c t i v i t y in t h e s e s e c t o r s . 
One prev ious e s t i m a t e was made by the 
Fraser of Allander I n s t i t u t e , in i t s June 
1986 Business Forecasting Service report,,, 
when i t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t , on t h e 
assumption of a 10J f a l l in "expor t s t o 
the Cont inen ta l shelf" ( the term used in 
the 1979 S c o t t i s h Input -Output Tables t o 
d e s c r i b e c u r r e n t f i n a l e x p e n d i t u r e s 
a s s o c i a t e d wi th North Sea o i l a c t i v i t y ) , 
around 8,000 d i r e c t and ind i rec t Scot t i sh 
j o b s might be l o s t . That e s t i m a t e was 
based on minimal i n fo rma t ion about the 
d i s t r i b u t i v e e f f e c t s of a f a l l in o i l 
p r i c e s and on t h e degree of a c t u a l f i n a l 
expend i tu re l o s s . I t assumed t h a t none 
of the income l o s t through employment 
f a l l s would be r e t a i n e d in the S c o t t i s h 
economy even a t a reduced l e v e l i e the 
a m e l i o r a t i v e e f f e c t s of r edundancy 
p a y m e n t s , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y e t c were 
ignored. 
Table 2.1 Main SIC ( 1 9 8 0 ) s e c t o r s 
expected to incur job losses 
SIC 
(1980) Description 
13 E x t r a c t i o n of Mineral Oil and 
Natural Gas 
32 M e c h a n i c a l E n g i n e e r i n g ( i n c l 
Module Manufacture e t c ) . 
34 E l e c t r i c a l & E l e c t r o n i c 
Engineering 
50 Construction 
61 Distribution & Supplies 
66 Catering 
74 Sea Transport 
75 Air Transport 
76 Supporting Services to Transport 
77 Miscellaneous Transport 4 Storage 
Services 
83 Business 4 Professional Services 
In t h i s a r t i c l e , an impact study based on 
a more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the s e c t o r a l 
employment e f fec ts associated with reduced 
ac t iv i ty in Scot t i sh indus t r ies re la ted to 
North Sea o i l work has been under taken. 
I t d r a w s d i r e c t e m p l o y m e n t l o s s 
i n fo rma t ion from a study c a r r i e d out by 
the Royal Bank of Scotland which est imates 
aggrega te d i r e c t j ob l o s s e s . Table 2.1 
shows t h e main S t a n d a r d I n d u s t r i a l 
Class i f ica t ion (SIC) categories which are 
expected to be affected by the f a l l in o i l 
p r i ce s . 
The Royal Bank of Scotland study estimated 
t h a t d i r e c t job l o s s e s in o i l and o i l 
r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i e s w i l l t o t a l between 
12,000 and 18,000 in the next two to three 
years. The est imate was drawn from North 
Sea assumptions forecasts under two future 
o i l p r i c e s c e n a r i o s . The Royal Bank's 
"Case A" postula tes pr ices which are low 
and, in p a r t i c u l a r , v o l a t i l e between $10 
and $20 f o r t h e r e s t of t h e decade 
followed by a sharp e s c a l a t i o n in r e a l 
t e rms . "Case B" a n t i c i p a t e s a gradual 
recovery in p r i c e s from $15 next year to 
reach $25 in 1990, a f t e r which there would 
be a g e n t l e a p p r e c i a t i o n in r e a l t e rms . 
Under these two s c e n a r i o s the Royal Bank 
f o r e c a s t d e t a i l e d f i e l d developments for 
the UK Continental Shelf for both o i l and 
gas . These f o r e c a s t s were then, wi th 
o the r assumpt ions , used to d r i v e the 
SDA's North Sea expend i tu re s model t o 
d e r i v e e s t i m a t e s of t h e Nor th Sea 
m a r k e t p l a c e over t h e n e x t d e c a d e . 
C r u c i a l l y , t he Royal Bank assumed a 30J 
drop in development c o s t s t o b r ing the 
1984 c o e f f i c i e n t s in the model i n t o l i n e 
with current market conditions; t h i s cost 
r educ t ion assumed to con t inue in fu tu re 
years as a r e su l t of improved technology. 
The e f f e c t of t h i s assumption was t h a t 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more developments were 
f o r e c a s t t o p r o c e e d than h a s been 
suggested by other forecasters but a t the 
c o s t of a l o w e r economic i m p a c t pe r 
pro jec t . 
The o u t - t u r n under both p r i ce s c e n a r i o s 
shows a s imilar number of projects coming 
on stream in the y e a r s t o the end of the 
cen tu ry . "Case A" sugges t s a f u r t h e r 
for ty-f ive o i l projects and twenty-six gas 
f i e l d s on s t ream by 1998 whi le "Case B" 
a n t i c i p a t e s f o r t y - s e v e n o i l projects and 
some t w e n t y - f i v e gas d e v e l o p m e n t s . 
However, t h e r e a re major d i f f e r e n c e s in 
the t ia ing of o i l f ie ld developments. In 
the yea r s t o 1991 "Case A" would produce 
only eleven new o i l f i e l d developments 
whi le "Case B" would see twenty-one such 
f i e l d s . The c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e s e 
d i f f e r e n t development p i c t u r e s on the 
•North Sea marketplace' are shown in Table 
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2.2. The figures represent not to ta l 
expenditure on oil and gas development but 
the « a r k e t of o i l company e x t e r n a l 
expenditures which in 1984 represented 58% 
of total expenditure. 
lane 22. Forecast orders placed for goods and 
services INS (fin 198M prices) under two 
price scenarios 
81-S 8M0 91-95 86-95 
Total Total Total Total 
CaseA 
Exploration 
Development 
Production 
General services 
Total 
CaaeB 
Exploration 
Developnent 
Production 
General services 
Total 
2,220 
7,979 
528 
4,771 
15,498 
2,220 
7,979 
528 
4,771 
15,496 
1,235 
4,629 
533 
4,079 
10,476 
1,517 
6,440 
537 
4,293 
12,787 
1,985 
6,591 
687 
5,417 
14,681 
1,784 
5,673 
767 
5,825 
14,249 
3,221 
11,220 
1,220 
9,496 
25,157 
3,301 
12,313 
1,304 
10,118 
27,036 
Source: Royal Bark cf Scotland 
The implications of the current oil price 
position for the marketplace can be seen 
c lear ly . "Case A" r e su l t s in a market 
over the next five years of some 68$ of 
the 1981-85 period. In the years 1991-
95, however, expenditure would bounce back 
to 95% of 1981-85. Under "Case B" the 
decline i s more gent le , to some 835 of 
1981-85 over the next five years , with a 
recovery to 92* in the 1990s. The Royal 
Bank went on to project what these figures 
could mean for employment in the industry 
recognising that an element in current job 
losses may have occurred regardless of any 
sharp price fal l . The conclusion arrived 
at was that job losses over the next two 
years, from the beginning of 1986, could 
total twelve-eighteen thousand depending 
on whe the r o i l p r i c e movements 
approximated to the pattern of "Case A", 
leading to the higher estimate of job 
losses , or "Case B" producing d i rec t job 
losses in the range of twelve thousand. 
In both cases the re would be some 
employment recovery in the 1990s. 
Taking these two aggregate figures as low 
and high estimates of d i rec t job l o s s , a 
share can be apportioned to each of the 
eleven SIC categories identified in Table 
2.1 (the share of employment decline in 
each sector i s d is t r ibuted by weighting 
each sector according to i t s importance in 
to ta l employment represented by the 11 
categories). Table 2.3 contains high and 
low est imates of the sectoral d i rec t 
employment loss. 
Table 2.3 Low and high es t imates of 
direct job loss (apportioned by 
sector) 
Direct job Direct job 
loss loss 
SIC (1980) 
13 
32 
34 
50 
61 
66 
74 
75 
76 
77 
83 
(low estimate) (high esti i 
5,220 
2,868 
264 
1,008 
504 
516 
216 
228 
240 
204 
732 
7,830 
4,302 
396 
1,512 
756 
774 
324 
342 
360 
306 
1,098 
The next step in the process of estimating 
the to t a l employment and output loss 
resulting from these direct job losses i s 
to d i s t r i bu t e the SIC (1980) sectoral 
t o t a l s over the relevant input-output 
sectors contained in the 1979 Scott ish 
Input-Output study (Industry Department 
for Scotland 1984). By doing th i s a 
direct output loss can be estimated (by 
multiplying d i rec t employment loss by 
sec tor with the r e c i p r o c a l of the 
appropriate employment:output coefficient) 
which will act as the primary raw data for 
estimating the to t a l ie . , d i rec t plus 
indirect output and employment losses. 
Table 2.4 Direct and total output effects 
g i v e n t h e low and h i g h 
estimates of direct job loss 
(1984 prices, £ million) 
Direct Total Share of GDP 
Estimate output output per annua 
loss loss 
Low 288.68 758.12 1.65* 
High 434.43 1,137.27 2.5* 
The impact study employed also takes into 
account the "Keynesian multiplier" effect 
of falls in consumers' expenditure brought 
about by these d i rec t f a l l s in output ie 
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"Type II" m u l t i p l i e r s are ca lcu la ted . 
The output r e s u l t s of t h i s e x e r c i s e are 
shown in Table 2 .4 . 
The output m u l t i p l i e r assoc iated with 
these direct output lo s ses i s 2.62 and, in 
each of the two years , the l o s s would 
account for 1.65* and 2.5* of S c o t t i s h 
Gross Domestic Product for the low and 
high estimates, respectively. 
Turning t o the s e c t o r a l employment 
results , the eighty-three Scottish input-
output s e c t o r s are aggregated t o some 
degree in order to present sectoral, total 
employment l o s s p r o j e c t i o n s . These 
projec t ions are contained in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6 for the low and high d i r e c t 
employment loss estimates, respectively. 
Table 2.5 TbML, aaetaral eaplojwflt loos In fee 
SoottlA floonv ever the react two years 
gtarcn \2fiOD direct oil and oU-reUbed 
j o b XOBBBB 
' Direct job Total Job 
5,220 
1,110 
1,758 
264 
Sector leas 
Primary 
Mineral oil & gas extract. 
Mineral oil processing 
Utilities 
Metals, ores & build, materials 
Chaiicalsi fertilisers 
Industrial plant & steelwork 
Metal goods & mean. eng. 
Ccroputers, conn. equip. etc 
Transport equipnent -
Food, food processing 4 tobac. 
Drink 
Textiles, leather & clothing 
Timber & furniture 
Paper, board, printing etc 
Rubber, plastics & other manuf. 
Construction 1,008 
Distribution 504 
Hotels & catering 516 
Transport 888 
Business services 732 
Other services 
Total 
loas 
. 618 
5,220 
3 
310 
222 
24 
1,129 
1,880 
312 
45 
316 
81 
91 
85 
247 
54 
1,797 
3,622 
2,075 
2,121 
3,611 
1,689 
12,000 25,553 
The employment multiplier associated with 
the low and high e s t imates of d i r e c t job 
l o s s i s 2.13. This m u l t i p l i e r i s f a i r l y 
high but represents the worst poss ib le 
outcome from the d i r e c t job l o s s 
forecasts. The results of this exercise 
imply t h a t no o f f s e t t i n g p o s i t i v e 
expenditures from redundancy payments, 
social security benef i t s or unemployment 
benefit w i l l take place in Scotland ie a 
r e s u l t i d e n t i c a l to the assumption that 
everyone l o s i n g the ir job migrates from 
the region. In order to provide an 
a l t e r n a t i v e picture of events i t was 
assumed that a proportion of the household 
e x p e n d i t u r e l o s s i d e n t i f i e d in the 
exercise was spent in Scotland. 
Table 2.6 Total, sectoral eaployaent loss In the 
SmUJiti ecxitoajr OPS* the next two years 
given 18/DO direct cdl and ell-related 
Direct job Total Job 
Sector 
Primary 
Mineral oil & gas extract. 
Mineral oil processing 
Utilities 
Metals, ores & build, materials 
Chemicals & fertilisers 
Industrial plant & steelwork 
Metal goods & mech. erg. 
Computers, cam. equip, etc 
Transport equipnent 
Food, food processing & tobac. 
Drink 
Textiles, leather & clothing 
Timber 4 furniture 
Paper, board, printing etc 
Rubber, plastics & other manuf. 
Construction 
Distribution 
Hotels* catering 
Transport 
Business services 
Other services 
Total 
loss loss 
-
7,630 
-
-
-
-
1,665 
2,638 
395 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
1,512 
755 
774 
1,331 
1,098 
-
929 
7,830 
5 
465 
331 
35 
1,695 
2,822 
470 
68 
474 
121 
138 
129 
371 
81 
2,697 
5,434 
3,122 
3,182 
5,412 
2,532 
tt/TJO 36333 
In the course of a p r e v i o u s study 
undertaken a t the I n s t i t u t e , i t was 
est imated t h a t unemployment b e n e f i t 
rece ivable as a proportion of est imated 
disposable income was 29* ( e x c l u d i n g 
supplementary benefit, redundancy payments 
e t c ) . I t i s f e l t that t h i s f igure i s 
somewhat low and t h a t l o n g - r u n 
amel iorat ive expenditure e f f e c t s should 
a l so take in to account migration r a t e s , 
marriage/family p r o f i l e s , unemployment 
duration ra tes and so on. This task 
involves a great deal of preparation and 
e f f o r t but s t i l l r e l i e s c ruc ia l l y on the 
assumptions made about future condit ions 
in local labour markets and personal 
expectations about employment prospects . 
These elements are extremely d i f f icu l t to 
a s s e s s accurately . Nevertheless , some 
adjustment upwards from the figure of 291 
d o e s seem a p p r o p r i a t e and, on a 
judgemental bas i s , 35* i s taken as the 
proportion of los t household income which 
should be added-back in the analysis. 
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Table 2.7 Total employment loss based on a low 
estimate of direct Job loss (12/00) and 
incorporating aaeliorative expenditure 
effects 
Sector 
Directjob Total job 
loss loss 
Primary 
Mineral oil & gas extract. 
Mineral oil processing 
Utilities 
Metals, ores & build, materials 
Chemicals & fertilisers 
Industrial plant & steelwork 
Mstal goods & mech. erg. 
Computers, oaim. equip, etc 
Transpcrtequipment 
Food, food processing & tobac. 
Drink 
Textiles, leather & clothing 
Timber & flmitire 
Paper, board, printing etc 
Rubber, plastics & other manuf. 
Construction 
Distribution 
Hotels & catering 
Transport 
Business services 
Other services 
-
5,220 
-
-
-
-
1,110 
1,758 
264 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,008 
504 
516 
888 
732 
-
392 
5,220 
3 
214 
204 
15 
1,128 
1,859 
299 
36 
190 
50 
57 
64 
196 
43 
1,623 
2,324 
1,739 
1,851 
3,023 
1,242 
Total 12,000 21,782 
Table 2.8 Total employment loss based on a low 
estimate of direct job loss (18,030) and 
incorporating ameliorative expenditure 
- <*ftc=ts 
Sector 
Directjob Total job 
loss loss 
Primary - 588 
Mineral oil & gas extract. 7,830 7,830 
Mineral oil processing - 4 
Utilities - 321 
Metals, ores & build, material - 305 
Chemicals & fertilisers - 24 
Industrial plant & steelwork 1,665 1,692 
Metal goods & msch. ens. 2,638 2,789 
Computers, conn, equip, etc 396 449 
Transport equipnait - 53 
Food, food processing & tcbac. - 285 
Drink - 75 
Textiles, leather & clothing - 87 
Timber & furniture - 95 
Paper, board, printing etc - 293 
Rubber, plastics & other manuf - 66 
Construction 1,512 2,435 
Distribution 756 3,485 
Hotels & catering 774 2,608 
Transport 1,331 2,792 
Business services 1,098 4,537 
Other services - 1,852 
Tota l 18,000 32,676 
When this positive, offsetting expenditure 
effect i s introduced in to the analysis , 
job loss effects are tempered. Tables 
2.7 and 2.8 contain de ta i l s of the to t a l 
sectoral employment losses using this less 
'extreme' assumption about migration and 
expenditure patterns. 
As can be seen from these tab les , most of 
the improved employment effects come via 
the service sectors which were ini t ia l ly 
very badly h i t through indi rec t effects . 
Total employment loss , using the low 
direct employment loss figures now stands 
a t 21,782 (down 3,771 on the t o t a l 
repor ted in Table 2.5). Of t h i s 
reduction, 2,929 jobs (78%) are in the 
service industries. For the high direct 
employment loss example, the new job loss 
to ta l f a l l s by 5,657 to 32,676. In t h i s 
i n s t a n c e , the o f f s e t t i n g expenditure 
e f f e c t s reduce the s e rv i ce s ec to r 
employment fal l by 4,388 (78% of the total 
amerliorative employment effect). 
Table 2.9 Total primary, manufacturing and service 
sector eapLoyment effects induced by 
direct oil sector employment falls of 
12,000 and 18,000, respectively 
Direct Total 
emplcjmait Pro- enpLoynsnt Pro-
effect portion effect portion 
Leu estimate 
Primary 
Manufacturing 
Services (inc. 
Construction 
& Utilities) 
5,220 
3,132 
3,648 
44% 
30% 
5,612 
4,144 
26% 
19% 
12,026 59% 
TOTAL 12,000 100% 21,782 100J 
Direct Total 
emplojment Pro- enpLojment Pro-
effect portion effect portion 
Hi#i estimate 
Primary 7,830 
Manufacturing 4,699 
Services (inc. 
CbnstrLction 
& Utilities) 5,471 
TDTflL 18,000 
44% 
Sty 
30% 
100% 
8,418 
6,218 
18,040 
32,676 
26% 
19% 
55% 
100% 
Table 2.9 presents a summary picture of 
the employment loss effects emanating from 
11 12 
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the present analysis (including 
expenditure add-back) by broad economic 
sectors. 
It is clear from this table that the 
service sector bears the brunt of indirect 
job losses as might be expected from a 
Type II multiplier analysis. In this 
instance the employment multiplier has 
fallen to 1.82, a 15% decrease from the 
worst possible scenario. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The assumption made when using input-
output tables in this kind of impact study 
is that the factors of production, for any 
commodity, are employed in fixed 
proportions. This allows us to use the 
"technological co-efficients" inherent in 
input-output tables for analytical 
purposes. However, this might not be the 
case. To the extent that the mix of 
factors of production has changed since 
1979, firms are willing to hoard (mainly) 
skilled labour, firms reduce labour costs 
eg wages, perks etc rattier than actual 
numbers, or firms use the current market 
difficulties as an excuse to discard 
employees in a "dead wood" trimming 
exercise, the multiplier effects suggested 
in this study could well be distorted. 
Nevertheless, given the drawbacks of the 
assumptions necessary to utilise the fixed 
input-output coefficients, the results 
detailed in Section 2 are, at least, 
plausible estimates of the 'possible' and 
'likely' overall employment effects which 
might occur in Scotland as a result of the 
oil price scenarios detailed in Section 2. 
Figures contained in the latest Scottish 
Abstract of Statistics (1985) put 
employment in companies wholly related to 
the North Sea oil industry at just over 
64,000 in mid-1984. Grampian Region 
estimated in 1985 that total oil-related 
employment was over 63,000. The latest 
estimate, contained in the Manpower 
Services Commission study already referred 
to, put the number of persons more than 
80% involved in oil-related work at 66,205 
(and that after a fall of 5,284 (7.4%) on 
the figure of December 1985). Our direct 
job loss estimates of 12,000 to 18,000 
take as their base figure the 1985 
estimate of wholly plus 80%+ oil-related 
employment ie 71,500. Consequently, we 
estimate that at least 17% and possibly as 
much as 25% of oil industry employment in 
Scotland will have disappeared between the 
beginning of 1986 and the first quarter of 
1988, given our oil price assumptions. 
This direct job loss effect is bound to 
fall most heavily in the Grampian Region, 
which accounts for more than 70% of 
Scottish oil industry and related 
employment. Albeit that over a quarter 
of the Grampian labour force (and probably 
a rather higher proportion of the workers 
losing employment) are not resident in the 
region. Another area which is likely to 
suffer equally severely in terms of its 
local economy, if not in overall Scottish 
terms, is the Shetland Islands. However, 
direct and indirect effects will be felt 
throughout Scotland. 
From the results of our 'likely' scenario, 
the Scottish unemployment rate looks set 
to rise, over the next two years, by 
between 0.9% and 1.3% more than it would 
have done bad the oil price fall not 
occurred. It is undoubtedly the case 
that Scotland has an interest in a stable 
oil price regime at a higher crude oil 
price than this year. Evidence for this 
is forthcoming from the profile of 
development activity and, hence, 
employment loss, presented in the two 
Royal Bank oil price cases. In "Case A", 
where the price is highly volatile, 
ranging between $10 and $20 over the next 
few years, high direct and indirect job 
losses are the result. In "Case B" where 
prices are much more stable and higher 
than at present, the job loss figures are 
much less severe although still painful in 
economic terms. Consequently, any 
government policy decisions which would 
stimulate North Sea activity should be 
unambiguously welcomed north of the 
border. The relief on Advance Petroleum 
Revenue Tax announced by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer goes some way towards 
helping the cash flow situation, 
especially for the independent oil 
companies. However, direct action to 
stimulate development activity, for 
example, co-operation with OPEC on pricing 
strategy and/or changes to the tax 
structure in the North Sea, shows no signs 
of emerging. 
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